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1 Introduction
Evolution has since the publication of The origin of species (1859) been a source of
inspiration, and a bone of contention, not only for biology but also for philosophy and the
sciences of man. The moral consequences of Darwinism have been a concern for ethicists
since Herbert Spencer elevated the survival of the fittest to a norm underwriting cultural and
societal progress—hard for the individual perhaps, but good for mankind. In contrast,
Thomas Huxley saw evolution as a story of cruelty and ruthless selfishness (“nature, red in
tooth and claw”), that a human moral society should combat rather than imitate.
In the past 150 years several varieties of evolutionary ethics have been proposed. This
review considers three books broadly concerned with meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is about the
meaning of moral statements and the nature of moral judgments, about the specific
characteristics of moral behaviour and moral attitudes, and about the nature of moral
properties. If we want to understand how moral judgement works, we have to understand
the mental architecture that produces such judgments, one might argue. That is why we
should also look at psychology, in particular moral psychology (see e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong
2008), as a resource for meta-ethics.
In psychology, evolutionary thinking has in recent years acquired a place, explaining
emotions, cognition, etc, as biological adaptations (e.g., Buss 2007). So, we can see the big
issue looming: can morality be explained as a biological adaptation, as an instinct, and most
importantly, what does that mean for the status of moral judgments and moral facts? If what
we do is not the result of a judgment about what is universally and objectively right or
wrong, but of the blind instincts of our animal nature, designed to promote survival of
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selfish genes, doesn’t that undermine the belief in morality? Doesn’t that expose our moral
intuitions as illusions? Could it be that we are not motivated to do the right thing by moral
judgments, but by blind instincts?
Central issues in the philosophical debate are (1) the objectivity of moral rules (moral
realism), (2) the relative contributions of nature vs. culture to our moral sense, (3) natural
morality (or proto-morality) and (4) moral nativism. When moral theorists turn to
evolutionary biology and psychology for support or criticism of these views on morality,
they rely, explicitly or implicitly, on concepts and ideas that are sometimes outdated, and
are easily simplified or distorted. A thumbnail sketch, in the next section, of a few recent
developments in evolutionary psychology may be useful to appreciate some of the pitfalls.
In particular, it is sometimes assumed that moral behaviour is basically altruism (not
coincidentally perhaps, explaining altruistic behaviour in animals is a showcase of
evolutionary biology). And adaptive explanations are not as simple, nor as complete, as
some moral philosophers seem to think.
2 Evolutionary Moral Psychology: Explaining Altruism, and Beyond
2.1 Evolutionary Explanations of Altruism
Evolutionary psychology (e.g., Buss 2007) assumes that the mind consists of a large
number of modules, each of which is a solution to an adaptive problem in the ancestral
environment. In principle, all human mental processes, capacities, feelings and emotions
can be explained as adaptations. For moral sentiments like altruism, roughly three
explanations have been proposed: reciprocal altruism, kin selection, and group selection.
Moral sentiments are basically instincts that are built by selfish genes, and are part of our
animal nature—altruism is widely present in the human kingdom. (For classic accounts of
the evolutionary roots of virtues, see Ridley (1996) and Wright (1994)). The evolutionary
approach has been eagerly adopted by defendants of naturalistic (meta)ethics—either for
vindicating or for debunking morality (Joyce 2006). However, it can be argued, first that the
naturalistic approach often fails to acknowledge the partial, heuristic and pluralistic
character of biological explanation, and that it sometimes overextends evolutionary
principles to cultural phenomena, and second that this view of virtues (altruism) as
instincts is too narrow a view of morality.
2.2 Broadening Morality: Moral Psychology Beyond Altruism
In a recent review article, Jonathan Haidt (2007) gives a useful and somewhat provocative
summary of the consensus in moral psychology, and suggests a broader definition of
morality than assumed in classical evolutionary psychology as sketched above. Morality is
mostly a matter of intuitions, sentiments and emotions, not rational judgment. And it is
presumably the product of a co-evolution of individual mental mechanisms and social and
cultural institutions: the social and the biological come together in emotions that are the
basis of morality. This leads to some important guidelines for understanding the
evolutionary bases of morals. Moral reasoning is secondary: the reasons we give are
mostly post-hoc justifications of moral intuitions. Moral intuitions are selected for being
useful, not for detecting truth; morality is for managing gossip, for keeping up one’s
reputation in one’s peer group, and that may require confabulation and deception rather than
getting at the truth. Kin selection can probably explain the moral intuition that we should
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avoid doing harm to others. Reciprocity and fairness can be explained from the necessity to
maintain one’s reputation as a reliable player: morality helps to create groups, where
reputation is something like indirect reciprocity. So far, these are individual (gene-centered)
selection processes. Group selection could be an additional level above the gene-level,
where the fitness of whole groups is subject to selection pressures. This implies that cultural
practices can modify genes, i.e. cultural practices can create new capacities and instincts.
Religion may be such a selecting force which creates specific sensitivities and which may
be adaptive at group level because religion directs the individual beyond himself. Another
example of cultural or group-level selection could be the phenomenon of mirror neurons
that detect intentions in our fellows (we immediately see disgust, we feel another’s pain):
living in groups is facilitated by such a mechanism. Thus, there must be more to morality
than just harm avoidance and fairness/reciprocity. This is important since it expands
morality beyond the individual gene-centered paradigm. Group selection may have created
its own moral intuitions, alongside individual gene selection. The former adds a tribal
overlay superimposing a collection of moral intuitions to our moral make-up: loyalty and
patriotism, authority and obedience, respect for tradition, and somehow an intuition for
sacredness and spiritual purity. These cannot be understood as a product of selection for
reciprocity and kin selection alone.
2.3 Broadening Evolutionary Explanation: Beyond the Selfish Gene
Evolutionary explanations are more problematic than psychologists and moral philosophers
seem to realise. Richardson (2007) points out that evolutionary psychology does not live up
to the standards of explanation in evolutionary biology. It often produces “just so stories”,
speculations about how a trait might possibly have been selected, whereas genuine
evolutionary theory specifies “how actually” selective history has worked in a specific case.
A devastating list of overlooked problems and ignored complexities of real biology leads
Laland and Brown (2002, p. 187) to the conclusion that evolutionary psychology has
missed the recent developments in biology, and gives an impoverished and simplified
picture of evolution.
More important for our present purpose, there are more levels and evolutionary
approaches than just evolutionary psychology: evolution is a multi-level phenomenon
(Laland and Brown p. 182). Recall that evolutionary moral psychology focuses on the
individual mental architecture and on sentiments and emotions. If the critics are right, and
evolution proceeds at several levels, that leaves out other levels of evolution—in particular
cultural evolution, and the interaction between genetic and cultural selection.
Thus, both what is meant by morality, and the mechanisms of evolution are more diverse
and fragmented than previously realised. Evolution is a multi-level phenomenon and there
is more to morality than reciprocal altruism, and there is more to consider than the
individual mental architecture that is the focus of classic evolutionary psychology.
This brief summary above intends to provide a background to appreciate three recent
books on evolution and moral philosophy, in particular the extent to which these moral
philosophers get evolution right.
3 Three Books on Evolution, Emotion and Morality
Neil Levy’s book What makes us moral? Crossing the boundaries of biology (2004)
provides a competent but not original review of the classical position in evolutionary
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psychology. Moral psychology from evolutionary perspective is discussed mainly as the
explanation of altruism, and we mentioned above, there is more to morality than altruism.
Levy seems to stick to the somewhat outdated orthodoxy in evolutionary psychology,
roughly Tooby and Cosmides’ (1992) project. There is also a passable discussion of the
(mis)interpretation of genetic determinism. Against this background, he introduces two
major issues, moral realism and moral objectivism, and the contribution of biology and
culture to understanding our moral sense. The main point, expressed in the title, is that we
are not determined by our biological nature, but that we reshape ourselves through culture.
He suggests that animals, like the famous altruistic vampire bats that help their fellows with
food, have a kind of proto-altruism. Full-blown human altruism has the same basis, but is
transformed by culture. Unfortunately, this interesting idea remains vague. Levy’s most
interesting contribution is a not much elaborated suggestion that we can transcend our
biological heritage, that biological altruism as result of evolved genetic selfishness can, in a
cultural setting, be turned against itself and become real altruism: “From the mindless and
mindlessly selfish rose beings capable of rationality and morality“ (p. 88). How and why
this happened is not explained in great detail.
Moral objectivism is a traditional philosophical issue that could look different when seen
from an evolutionary perspective. If altruism is a product of selfish genes, it is selfishness in
disguise, and belief in objective and binding moral rules is self-deception. To borrow an
example from Richard Joyce, when our moral intuitions can be explained as pre-wired in
our brain, the existence of moral facts (objective facts, outside of us) is irrelevant to moral
behaviour; just like when a paranoiac believes that he is persecuted, it is irrelevant for his
behaviour whether indeed someone is after him. Morality is likewise subjective and has no
basis in reality, although it can be a powerful determinant of moral behaviour. However,
this is a rather crude comparison: moral properties can be both subject-dependent and to
some extent real. Jesse Prinz (see below) illustrates this when he compares moral properties
with secondary qualities like colours.
Levy’s book leaves us with two important issues: Are moral sentiments like altruism just
sentiments, feelings, or instincts, and does that undermine moral objectivity? And could we
understand morality not just as a biological adaptation but as a bio-cultural phenomenon?
Richard Joyce’s The evolution of morality (2006) uses the literature on evolution and
morality to make his favourite philosophical point, that morality is indeed a “myth”.
As a moral philosopher Joyce is a moral skepticist or nihilist—the final chapter of his
book is devoted to the “evolutionary debunking of morality”.
In an important correction to the uncritical extrapolation of evolution to ethics, Joyce
points (p. 49) out that altruism in the animal kingdom, presumably based on kin selection or
reciprocity, does not qualify as genuine morality. In fact, extending help beyond one’s direct
friends and relatives is characteristic of morals. Furthermore, morality requires moral
judgment, not just pro-social emotions. And it involves a categorical imperative: moral
judgment is not an advice about the most expedient way to reach a goal, moral rules are not
relative to some end (happiness, utility, or whatever) of individual or society. Explaining the
emotional mechanisms behind pro-social behaviour (the urge to submit to authority, to
avoid harm to others, to maintain standards of purity, to help, to reciprocate, to be fair) falls
short of explaining moral judgment.
In sum, moral judgment entails deliberation, is inescapable (categorical, absolute), and is
independent of personal interest; all this cannot be accounted for by specifying emotional
and behavioural programs as biological adaptations. That “being nice helped our ancestors
to make more babies” (Joyce, p. 222) is not much of an explanation of ethics.
120 H. Looren de Jong
Joyce proposes a theory about the evolutionary origins of morality: it has an innate basis,
an evolutionary origin, in the sense that it evolved as an adaptation (presumably, reciprocity
rather than kin selection was the driving force behind this selection). The idea is that the
adaptive function of moral sense is to add motivation for adaptive social behaviours. This is
an admittedly just-so story on the development of morality. Evolution, he hypothesises,
manipulated emotional centres in the brain to enable moral judgment. Thus, we seem to see
or feel things as evil; we experience good and evil as objective properties of the situation,
not as something subjective in us. Mother Nature fools us into believing that moral is
objective—that is the most effective way to motivate the agent—whereas in reality it is just
something of our own making. This evolutionary hypothesis supports the philosophical
position of moral projectivism, already proposed by David Hume. Vice and virtue are not
properties in objects, but perceptions in the mind. Moral judgment is projecting one’s
emotions onto one’s experience of the world. (Below, we will see that Prinz has a more
realistic view here that is at least as plausible: perspectivism rather than projectivism).
Thus, along this biological path, Joyce has arrived at his favourite position of moral
scepticism; trust in our moral judgment is undermined. We have no reason to believe that
our moral judgments are true or justified. The real drive behind moral behaviour is emotion;
not moral facts and reasons but the moral emotions are in force and guide behaviour.
Darwinian thinking tells us why Hume’s notion of moral sentiments is on the right track,
why we have such sentiments, and why they seem to have a particular unconditional
authority. The venerable Kantian tradition is undermined: a morality that is based on
(though not identical with) sentiments and biological adaptations cannot be unconditionally
and universally binding for all rational beings—though they may feel thus.
Jesse Prinz’ The emotional construction of morals (2007) brings less (second-hand)
evolution, and more of an original theory of morality than both Levy and Joyce. In the first
chapters Prinz gets himself and his readers deeply into analytical philosophy and
metaphysics. It is the kind of book where one finds sentences like: “As perspectivists,
sensibility theorists are committed to metaphysical emotionism” (p. 15).
Prinz’ position is essentially neo-Humean: morality is a matter of sensations, moral
feeling, and emotions. Emotions are an essential part of moral judgments. This is illustrated
by the phenomenon of dumfounding: for some strong moral intuitions (cannibalism, incest)
subjects may not be able to give rational arguments, but that does not diminish the moral
strength of their opinions; obviously, emotions, not moral rules drive moral opinion. One
does not acquire moral concepts and moral knowledge from just being told or reading about
normative rules: there are no moral attitudes without emotional responses. Moral properties
are characterised by our emotional responses, and have no common unifying characteristics
apart form these responses. That is, morals are made by our mental apparatus, and do not
exist outside us.
In the first part Prinz presents the sensibility theory of emotions in general: these are
closely analogous to perceptions. The second is about the construction of moral emotions,
through mental, social and historical activity. It provides a “genealogy of morals”, tracing
the origin of our norms in biological and historical perspective, and a chapter on the limits
of evolutionary explanations. Prinz labels his theory constructive sentimentalism. It is based
on a theory that emotions are felt responses to bodily processes that serve to detect and
represent concerns. Concerns are the important aspects of organism and environment (loss,
danger, offense etc.), detected by the mind like a smoke detector detects fire. Put differently,
emotions are appraisals representing concerns in the form of feelings; judgment, reasoning
and cognitive elaborations play a secondary role. Prinz suggests that moral concepts
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incorporate the emotions that caused them. For that reason, moral concepts and
representation are intrinsically motivating.
Moral emotions then are according to Prinz derived from basic emotions, e.g.
indignation is the moral extension of anger. How many moral emotions can we distinguish?
A more or less accepted proposal is that we have norms for three domains, labeled
autonomy (transgressions against persons), purity (transgressions against a deity or nature)
and community (transgressions against rank or hierarchy). Violations of norms cause anger,
disgust and contempt—the primary basic emotional responses to transgression against
individuals, nature, and community, respectively. This is known as the CAD (contempt,
anger, disgust) model.
Prinz’ theory seems to imply moral relativism and subjectivism. Since moral properties
are characterized by their power to cause emotions in us, they must be relative and
subjective, as human constructions, made by us collectively. Our responses are the moral
truth-makers. However, perspectivism is a better label for this view than relativism or
projectivism. Moral properties are real in the same way as money or the monarchy are real:
they depend on collective minds, they are social constructions, but not necessarily arbitrary
or illusory. Like secondary qualities (color, or temperature) they depend on the perspective
of a collective subject, but that does not mean that they are projections from the subject
onto reality.
In a separate chapter Dining with cannibals Prinz shows that moral properties are
culturally variable (cannibalism is accepted in some societies, unspeakable in others). In a
chapter with the title Genealogy of morals (with a reference to Nietzsche) Prinz sketches a
program to explain the origin of morals from biological and cultural factors. Thus, it is to be
expected that different cultures create different moralities.
For our purposes, Chapter 7, The limits of evolutionary ethics is the most interesting part
of the book. One project in evolutionary ethics is to trace “natural” norms that are innate,
part of our animal nature and perhaps also present in primates. Such natural norms could be
considered as proto-morality, as more basic, and somehow privileged. Prinz rejects this:
morality is not natural at base but artificial all the way down. Biological dispositions as
such are not moral rules: these require language, judgment, and beliefs, i.e. cognitive and
cultural capacities, to qualify as moral. In addition, he points out that the traditional focus
on helping (altruism, fairness, and cheating) is rather limited. Two other domains of
morality with a biological background are matters of rank and authority, and those related to
sex (incest, fidelity). The latter two have been neglected by evolutionary psychologists.
Moreover, in these domains (altruism, authority and sex) there is a large variety across
cultures in forms of altruism, authority, and what counts as unnatural behavior. (As we have
seen, classical evolutionary psychology considers human mental architecture universal).
That means that there is no “natural” morality that could vindicate an ethical system as the
most natural and thus somehow privileged. Biological good is not necessarily moral good:
only in the latter case do we care, i.e. do we have the corresponding emotion; whether
something is good for our genes is not a moral concern. That morals are not innate does not
mean that “morality is no more than a collective illusion fobbed of on us by our genes” as
Michael Ruse put it (quoted in Prinz (2007, p. 256)).
The search for a morality in primates does not help either: in Prinz’ view, behavior that
can be characterized as helping or pro-social is not necessarily the result of moral judgment,
and therefore not genuinely moral. Altruistic behavior in primates is not necessarily
determined by moral considerations. Most probably, morality is a by-product of a set of
biological adaptations, thus as such it is not innate. Emotions (self-directed and other-
directed), the capacity for rules, imitation, and mind-reading are among the ingredients.
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Besides, meta-emotions (“you should be ashamed”), punishment for transgressors, and
punishment for those who do not enforce norms, all help to inculcate the appropriate
attitudes. All these capacities and cultural factors may instill the sentiments and attitudes
that form the basis of morality. Such moral attitudes are new to evolution; we learn to
consider helping, respect for authority, and decency as good. Unlike primates, these
attitudes extend our natural sympathies beyond the direct relatives to society at large.
To sum up, Prinz presents a subjectivist, emotivist/sentimentalist, bio-cultural and
naturalist theory of moral emotions. Sentiments are the basis or morality, and moral
emotions are derived from non-moral emotions. Morality is upgraded and extended from its
biological origins through enculturation. Whereas primates have the behavioral tendencies
but not the moral sense human “moralization” reshapes human nature. This amounts to a
bio-cultural view of morality. Biological tendencies are reshaped and extended through
enculturation. E.g., respect for rank is biologically based, but it works out quite different in
different cultures; it is not something that is specified by our genes.
Whereas evolutionary psychologist present “evoked culture” as an epigenetic switch on
a genetic program, the bio-cultural view locates the determinants of morality in cognitive
and cultural factors. Biological evolution has fitted us with a set of emotional and
behavioral programs that have contributed to the emergence of morality, but are not fully
moral in themselves.
4 Conclusion
What might these three books mean for moral theory? First, let us note that all three start
from a naturalistic point of view. Moral objectivism and moral rationalism are traditional
views in meta-ethics that have come under naturalistic criticism. At least since Kant,
morality has been seen as objective, universal and rational. Moral realists assume that there
are such things like moral facts, and that we are somehow capable of detecting them: when
making a moral judgment, we express a state of affairs. Moral objectivism, the claim that
moral judgments express moral truths, is undermined by the evolutionary claim that our
moral judgments are produced by mental mechanisms that are the contingent outcome of
evolutionary selection.
Another meta-ethical position that seems to be undermined by evolutionary moral
psychology is moral rationalism, the notion that moral judgments are the result of conscious
rational reasoning. In contrast, Jonathan Haidt (2001) argued that “the emotional tail wags
the rational dog”: moral judgment and rational moral discourse is a post-hoc rationalisation
of subconscious, intuitive, holistic and emotional processes. So, the basis of moral
judgment is not reason and rational discourse; rather in fact the path goes backward from
judgment to reasoning: moral justification is post-hoc rationalisation, made to fit a precious
unconscious decision. Thus, moral rationalism is undercut by the discovery that most of our
moral reasons are post hoc justifications of unconscious intuitions, inaccessible to
conscious reasoning.
Furthermore, the diversity in norms between cultures and their genealogy indicates, as
Prinz shows, that morality is not universal either, and is a contingent product of cultural
developments. Thus, an attempt to ground morality in evolution, more precisely in innate
(primate) proto-morality, is not going to work.
Universal, binding and objective moral rules thus sit uncomfortably with the
naturalist view. Of course, as Joyce (2006) argues, this still leaves an instrumental role
for moral sentiments. They remain in force because of the permanence of moral
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emotions, and they underpin the moral behaviour that keeps society afloat. But the
feeling that our moral intuitions are much more obligatory than mere useful conventions
is diagnosed as subjective sentiment, a trick Mother Nature invented to keep agents
within limits.
Secondly, an interesting new development is the extension of morality beyond altruism,
and of naturalistic explanations of morality beyond individual gene-entered adaptations for
reciprocity and kin selection. The view of morality has traditionally been restricted to
altruism, and Levy’s and to some extent Joyce’s book suffer from a narrow focus on
reciprocity and kin selection. As Haidt (2007) and Prinz point out, morality also includes
norms for loyalty, purity, authority, respect etc. Prinz incorporates other moral emotions
than altruism in his theory, and shows how they differ across cultures. Biology alone is too
abstract and not specific enough to explain this range of diversity.
Levy and perhaps Joyce seem to unquestioningly accept evolutionary explanations and
try to adjust a meta-ethical program to it. Traditionally, these explanations focus on innate
individual moral sentiments, subserving kin selection and reciprocity. The exclusive focus
on the sentiments and the fixed architecture of the individual mind, ignoring cultural layers
of human nature, looks naïve and simplistic in the light of recent developments.
Evolutionary psychology focusing on a fixed individual mental architecture is not the only
naturalistic approach to human nature. Although Joyce and Levy mention culture, they have
little to say on the mechanisms of cultural influence. Prinz rightly includes enculturation
and the interaction between genes and culture as a factor in the genealogy of morals. Such
an enlargement of the evolutionary paradigm is more in accordance with modern gene-
culture co-evolution approaches in biology than the impoverished and simplistic
evolutionary explanations that inspired the other two authors.
The bio-cultural model Prinz defends implies a cultural level of evolution interacting
with innate biological capacities. Culture is more than a trigger for genetic program. That
genes and cultural evolution can interact is not controversial—a standard example is dairy
farming as a cultural element that co-evolved with lactose tolerance as a genetically fixed
trait. The case of morality will be more complicated, but Prinz’ “genealogy” gives a few
interesting impulses.
Although Joyce and Levy pay some lip-service to the idea of a cultural superstructure on
our biological heritage, the notion of levels of selection and evolution as a multi level
phenomenon is largely absent in these authors. The co-development of genes and culture
could be part of a multi-level explanation of morality, that bypasses the narrowly
individualistic framework of evolutionary psychology. Several levels of explanation may
coexist in evolution, and human nature may be seen as a layered structure of genetic and
cultural levels.
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